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THE OPERATING RATIO AS A YARDSTICK
FOR MEASURING AIRLINE PROFITS
By CAPTAIN EDDIE RICKENBACKER,
Chairman of the Board, Eastern Air Lines, Inc.
SINCE the establishment of economic regulation of the nation's
scheduled airlines in 1938, industry profits have in most cases been
measured in accordance with the rate-of-return theory. Although
rate-making by the Civil Aeronautics Board has been largely confined
to the setting of mail rates, the method used has conformed closely
to that long employed in the regulation of railroads and public utili-
ties, namely, to allow a specified rate of return on the prudent invest-
ment of the enterprise, plus approved operating expenses.
Is it realistic to assume that the airline industry is sufficiently simi-
lar in structure and operations to the older utilities and the railroads
so that the rate-of-return-on-investment principle of profits determina-
tion can be applied alike to both fields? Or will the continued appli-
cation of this principle to the air carriers starve the carriers of capital
and defeat the endeavors of management to build a strong air trans-
portation system?
Instead of using rate-of-return-on-investment as the sole, or even
the primary, yardstick for measuring air-carrier earnings, it is submit-
ted that the Board should attach primary significance to the operating
ratio. Although this measure is of comparatively recent application
in transportation, it is particularly adaptable to industries with a rela-
tively rapid capital turnover, small investment, and heavy risks from
competition and economic forces beyond the control of management.
Under this method, the carrier's profits are measured by the ratio be-
tween operating expenses and operating revenues. If, for example, it
is determined that a margin of 20 percent is necessary to pay taxes and
dividends, and attract new capital, rates will be fixed so that operating
expenses will not exceed 80 percent of operating revenues. Thus,
after meeting all such expenses, the airline will have 20 percent of its
gross revenues left for taxes, capital requirements, dividends, etc.
This paper is designed to spotlight the advantages of and need for
the use of operating ratio as a device for measuring and regulating
airline profits.
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HISTORICAL USE OF PROFITS YARDSTICKS
Most railroad and public-utility regulation had its origin in the
closing decades of the last century. Almost from the beginning of
rate regulation - in some instances considerably after the start of gen-
eral utility regulation - the rate-of-return philosophy has dominated.
Underlying the application of this yardstick for determining allowable
profits for industries dedicated to the public service has been the fear
that without rate-regulation, railroads and public utilities might charge
excessive rates and engage in monopolistic practices inimical to the
public interest. Regulation was regarded as the substitute for com-
petition, and one of its objectives was to set rates where they would
be if there were active and effective competition. The assumption
was that under free competition rates would gravitate to cost, includ-
ing a fair return on investment.
Until recently there has been little effort on the part of regulatory
agencies to adopt a more realistic substitute for the rate of return.
Vast sums of money and much time have been devoted to refining the
methodology used in applying the rate-of-return principle; in attempt-
ing to adjust rate bases to changing economic conditions, as in the
case of the long-standing controversy over whether the rate base should
be original cost or reproduction; and in debating what elements should
be included in the rate of return itself. Only recently, however, has
serious consideration been given to the substitution of a basically new
approach to the problem.
In transportation, the first significant change came during and
after World War II when it became increasingly evident that applica-
tion of the rate-of-return principle to the motor-carrier industry was
wholly unrealistic. The Interstate Commerce Commission, in a series
of regional motor-carrier rate cases, recognized that in an industry
where the investment is small in relation to the revenues produced,
profits could not be tied to the small investment base without re-
ducing them to dangerously low levels. A return on such a base, at
rates considered "normal" by conventional utility standards. would
leave such a narrow margin between operating expenses and revenues
that even a minor fluctuation in either could wipe it out and perhaps
turn it into a loss. As the Commission said in a 1948 motor-carrier
case:
"The important difference . is whether return on investinent
or operating ratio is the criterion for determining the need for
general increases in the rates .. .In industries where the amount
of investment is large in relation to total costs, the rate of return
on investment generally has been accepted as appropriate for deter-
mining revenue needs. In such industries the risk is related more
to the amount of investment and less to costs. On the other hand,
where the amount of the investment is relatively small in relation
to total costs, investment is not the primary factor in determining
revenue needs. . . The owners of motor carriers can hardly be
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expected to look to the return on the amount of their investment
as an incentive where the principal risk is attached to the sub-
stantially greater amount of expense .... But for the purpose of
determining the need of increases in rates, the criterion must be
the carrier's cost."
1
Accordingly, the Commission has recognized the usefulness of the
operating ratio as a measure of earnings in the motor-carrier industry.
The ICC has also used the operating ratio theory in setting and
approving motor bus rates (Investigation of Bus Fares, I.C.C. Docket
MC-C-550, 1949), a procedure meeting court approval (County Board
of Arlington v. U.S., 101 F. Supp. 328 (1952.) In the former case the
ICC approved an operating ratio of 85 percent before normal Federal
income taxes for the inter-city bus carriers as a group which is equiva-
lent to a ratio of 83 at the presently prevailing tax level. Further, the
National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissions, through
a report of a special committee (presented at annual meeting, Novem-
ber 10-13, 1952), has urged the adoption and use of the operating ratio
theory of judging bus fares. As will hereinafter appear, bus com-
panies and air lines are quite similar in financial operating charac-
teristics.
The CAB has asserted that it does not rely exclusively on rate-of-
return as a measure of earnings.
"In its brief the carrier strongly objects to the adoption of a
fixed return upon the fair value of the carrier's property as the
measure of a fair and reasonable rate. The Board does not consider,
nor has it ever considered, that a predetermined rate of return
upon the so-called 'fair value' of the carrier's property is the
measure of reasonableness. The ascertainment of the rate of return
upon the actual legitimate investment, that is, the funds which
have been legitimately devoted to the enterprise by its owners,
does not share the defects of the so-called 'fair value' method and
may be considered as evidence bearing upon the reasonableness
within the meaning of the Civil Aeronautics Act, albeit not the
only such evidence.
"While it would be erroneous to assume that the reasonableness
of an air mail rate under the Civil Aeronautics Act should be meas-
ured by a fixed and uniform rate of return on the carrier's legiti-
mate investment, it would be equally erroneous to assume that a
reasonable rate could be determined in disregard of the relation
which the carrier's net earnings bear to its investment. The Civil
Aeronautics Act, as previously pointed out, requires the Board to
consider the 'need' of the air carrier for a rate which will be suffi-
cient, among other things, to insure the performance of the mail
service. Obviously, a carrier would be unable to perform such
service unless it were receiving from various sources, including the
mail compensation, a total revenue sufficient to cover the total ex-
penses of operation and the capital cost. In determining the 'need'
1 Middle West General Increases, Docket No. M-2723, July 19, 1948, 48 M.C.C.
541. Other motor carrier cases presenting a similar viewpoint on operating
ratios are: Central Territory General Increases, 49 M.C.C. 4; Increased Common
Carrier Truck Rates in the East, 42 M.C.C. 633; and, Increased Common Carrier
Truck Rates in New England, 43 M.C.C. 13.
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of the carrier, therefore, it is necessary to inquire into the amount
of the carrier's investment and to consider what is necessary to
constitute an adequate return on that investment. A specified re-
turn on a carrier's investment which would enable that carrier to
earn an amount sufficient to cover its capital cost would not be an
inflexible measure of the fair and reasonable rate contemplated by
the Civil Aeronautics Act; it would, however, constitute significant
and valuable evidence to be taken into account in connection with
the determination of such a rate. Likewise, the relationship which
the carrier's profit bears to its total revenues, would offer some
evidence of reasonableness when considered in comparison with
similar data of other industries of similar risk. In this connection
the ratio between the carrier's investment and the volume of service
rendered, when compared with the higher ratio prevailing in other
public utilities, would also be a proper subject of consideration."1
And it has recognized the inadequacy of the rate-of-return standard
in several cases involving mail pay for local service lines. In its de-
cisions of July 21, 1950, setting mail rates for Pioneer Airlines and
Trans-Texas Airways, the Board noted.that:
"Quantitative standards are not prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics
Act for fixing fair and reasonable mail rates. During the war and
subsequently, the Board in its informed judgment and weighing
all considerations applicable to the mail rate cases before it, con-
cluded that a profit element based on a quantitative standard of a
specified return on recognized investment would best promote the
objectives of the Act. In a recent mail rate case involving a feeder
line and in the instant case, we have encountered situations where,
because of an exceptionally high turnover of invested capital, a
profit element based on a normal return on investment would be
inadequate to enable a small carrier to continue the reasonably
vigorous development we are charged to promote and would pro-
vide such a carrier with a precariously small margin to cope with
the risks and vicissitudes of the highly dynamic airline industry."'
and
"The establishment of a future rate predicated on a profit related
solely to the very low investment of 13.68 cents per plane mile in
this case would produce a margin precariously small to meet un-
foreseen future events. We believe that the rate for the future pe-
riod must incorporate an operating margin sufficient to afford rea-
sonable opportunity for management to earn a fair. profit within the
range established in presently effective final mail rates for other
feeder airlines. Accordingly, as the table above indicates, we have
provided a profit of 3.54 cents per plane mile before taxes and 2.19
cents per plane mile after taxes at the forecast load factor in order
to provide a fair and reasonable rate for the future period."
2
But the Board has not yet given the affirmative recognition to the
operating ratio which it deserves as a measure of airline earnings.
Nor has the Board shown adequate recognition of the fact that the
airline industry as a whole is characterized by high capital-turnover
1 Am.erican Airlines, Inc.-Mail Rates, 3 C.A.B. 329 (1942).
1 Order No. E-4450.
2 Order No. E-4449.
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ratios, and that the rate-of-return standard is, for that reason, little
more appropriate for large_ airlines than for small ones.
The incongruity of applying ordinary rate-of-return standards to
an airline with asmall investment relative to volume of business is
shown in the Trans-Texas case just cited. The Board decided to fix
the profit element in terms of profit per mile flown, instead of a per-
centage-on investment.
The following table shows the results:
Rate of Return Operating Margin
Profits allowed before taxes
Percent on investment 25.68%
Percent of expenses 4.43%
Profits allowed after taxes
Percent on investment 15.89%
Percent of expenses 2.74%
In other words, the profits finally approved by the Board represented
a return on investment of 25.68 percent before taxes and 15.89 percent
after taxes - rates of return which are certainly higher than those con-
sidered normal in public-utility regulation. Yet the resultant oper-
ating ratio of 95.57 percent before taxes and 97.26 percent after taxes
indicates that the carrier was being provided a dangerously narrow
margin of profit - a margin which even a small change in revenues
or expenses would wipe out. Obviously, a traditional rate of return
of 6 or 8 percent on the.carrier's investment would have been ridicu-
lously inadequate.
The rate-of-return approach is similarly - if not equally - in-
appropriate for the airline. industry generally, as will be shown.
PROFITS YARDSTICKS FOR THE AIRLINES
Before getting into further detail, it should be pointed out that the
airline industry has very little in common with those industries which
were first subjected to rate regulation and for whom the rate-of-return
measure was devised. There is the obvious similarity of being sub-
ject to regulation, but from that point on, the differences become more
prominent than the similarities. And they are differences which have
a bearing on the standard to be used in measuring earnings.
A bsence of Monopoly. The industries to which the rate-of-return
standard has traditionally been applied - railroads, gas and electric
utilities, street railway companies, water companies, etc. - are fre-
quently referred to as "natural monopolies." In many cases, competi-
tion was not feasible - e.g. it would not be feasible for competing
street car companies to lay duplicate sets of tracks on city streets. In
all cases, the amount of capital required to enter the business tended
to prevent competition. And in all cases, competition was largely
lacking. For example, except for the very early days of the railroads
when canals furnished substantial competition and a brief period in
the early part of the present century when the electricinterurban was
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a competitor in a few areas, the railroads experienced no real competi-
tion until the appearance of the motor bus and truck soon after the
close of World War I.
The scheduled airline industry never has had a monopoly status
in the same sense as that attained by the public-utility industries. The
airlines have always been highly competitive with one another, and,
from the inception of scheduled commercial air operations to the
present, the industry has experienced keen competition from surface
transportation and from the private automobile. That the airlines
have been steadily increasing their penetration of the inter-city com-
mon-carrier passenger market is a tribute to industry initiative and
management; it is not due to a lack of effective competition.1
The competition to which the airlines are subjected tends con-
stantly to generate over-capacity. Another result of this competition
is the frequent introduction of new plane types, with costly integration
periods (including in some cases, expensive groundings) and high
depreciation costs. And the cost of this competitive race for the most
modern and efficient equipment is going up all the time. Aircraft now
on order by the industry to be delivered within the next two and a half
years will cost $298,000,000. Current prices for the largest aircraft in
operation will approximate $2,000,000, with jet aircraft, when these
are introduced, costing from $3,500,000 to $4,000,000 each. By con-
trast, prior to the mid-1930's, the railroads had made no important
equipment changes for decades. Only since the war have they pro-
ceeded rapidly with dieselization.
Instability of Revenues and Expenses. For a variety of reasons,
airline revenues and expenses - and hence earnings - are subject to
violent fluctuations. Let us look at just a few of the reasons. First of
all, demand for airline transportation is much more elastic than that
for such public-utility services as electric light and power, telephone,
gas and even city transit. Just as an illustration, although business
generally was booming and reaching new highs every month, airline
traffic unaccountably leveled off in 1946-47 at the very time the in-
dustry was in the midst of its reconversion and re-equipment program.
The result was operating losses of nearly $28,000,000 for the domes-
tic industry.
The effect of accidents upon airline revenues is common knowl-
edge. A spectacular aircraft accident, even though not involving an
airline airplane at all, with the dramatic treatment still generally
accorded it by the newspapers and radio, can cost the airlines millions
of dollars in lost revenues.
Expenses are similarly volatile. The cost of grounding a fleet of
aircraft until "bugs" can be worked out can run into the millions.
I While domestic scheduled airlines have increased their share of the Class A
travel market (rail pullman plus air) from 22.99 percent in 1946 to 55.42 percent
in 1952, total common-carrier participation in U.S. inter-city -passenger-miles
has declined from 26.27 percent to 13.76 percent. Greatest losses have been to the
private automobile.
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In a rapidly expanding industry, where labor costs account for
approximately half of the total, a change in wage rates can have a
marked effect.
These are but a small sample of the many influences which con-
tribute to the instability of airline earnings.
Capital Turnover and Revenues. The relationship of capital to
revenues and costs is a major difference between the airlines and the
public utilities and railroads - and a major reason why rate of return
is not an appropriate standard for measuring airline profits. Railroads
and public utilities generally have a much slower capital turnover
than the airlines and motor carriers. A comparison of capital-turn-
over rates in the railroad, motor-carrier, electric-utility, and airline
industries appears below. Treatment of the significance of these
industry variations will appear at a later point.
One significant result of the distinction just noted, coupled with
the use of the rate-of-return standard for regulating the earnings of
the two industries, is the different margin between operating revenues
and operating expenses disclosed in the following table. Table 2
shows these relationships for 1946 and for 1949.
TABLE 2




Operating Operating Before After
Revenues Expenses Taxes Taxes
(000) (000) (%) (%)
Domestic Trunk Airlines $ 329,8721 $ 339,932 103.0 103.2
Class I Railways 7,628,000 6,357,000 83.3 85.9
Motor Carriers-of Passengers 380.627 299.217 78.6 86.8
Motor Carriers of Property 883,806 852,292 96.4 97.5
Electric Utilities 3,815,000 2,699,000 70.7 78.4
1949
Domestic Trunk Airlines $ 534,708 $ 501,982 93.9 95.3
Class I Railways 8,580,000 6,892.000 80.3 77.3
Motor Carriers of Passengers 379,751 345,585 91.0 94.3
Motor Carriers of Property 1,894,588 1,793,814 94.7 96.5
Electric Utilities 5,069,000 3,746,000 73.9 81.2
NOTE: See T.sble 1 for footnote and sources. Operating ratios are shown
before and after income taxes.
ADVANTAGES OF THE OPERATING RATIO AS A YARDSTICK
The operating ratio has distinct advantages as a yardstick for
measuring and for establishing airline profits.
Minimizing of Risks. The major advantage of the ratio for this
purpose is the protection which it affords against unforeseen fluctua-
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tions in revenues or costs in an industry with relatively small invest-
ment and rapid capital turnover. The means by which the operating
ratio provides such protection can be rather simply explained.
In an industry with a large capital investment and a low rate of
capital turnover, profits representing a fair (in the public-utility
sense) return on investment will ordinarily represent a substantial
proportion of gross revenues. Thus, if a company has a capital invest-
ment of $100,000,000 and annual revenues of $40,000,000 (a capital
turnover of 40%), a return of 6 percent on investment will represent
profits amounting to 15 percent of operating revenues. Because the
investment base is large in relation to operating revenues, profits de-
termined on that base will provide a substantial margin over operat-
ing expenses - in this case, 15 percent.
But if the relationship of investment and revenues is reversed, so
is the effect upon the margin. If investment is $40,000,000 and annual
revenues $100,000,000 (a capital turnover of 250%), a return of 6 per-
cent on investment amounts to only 2.4 percent of revenues. With
such a margin, a small change in either revenues or expenses can turn
the profit into a loss.
As a further illustration, let us look back to some of the figures
already given. From Table 1 it is seen that in 1949 the Class I rail-
ways grossed 37.2 cents for every dollar of capital investment, while
the domestic trunk airlines obtained 143.7 cents. If it is assumed that
each industry is to be allowed a return of 6 percent on each dollar Of
invested capital, the railways will have a profit equal to 16.1 percent
of their gross revenues, while the airlines' profit would be only 4.2
percent of revenues. In other words, after paying their operating
expenses, the airlines would have left only about one-fourth as much
of their yearly gross revenues as would the railroads.
But now let us suppose that the two industries experience a 10
percent increase in expenses; The railways would still have an oper-
ating profit, but the airlines would be in the red.
Additional computations would only serve to dramatize the points
already made: (1) to allow a return on investment, at rates traditional
in the public-utility field, to an industry with a high capital turnover
provides a dangerously narrow margin of safety; (2) where earnings
are controlled by the rate-of-return method, the industry with the
higher capital turnover is less able to meet adverse changes in either
revenues or expenses. It should be obvious, therefore, that that method
of earnings-control is an extremely risky one for an industry character-
ized, as is the airline industry, by a high capital turnover, coupled
with instability of both revenues and expenses.
Table 3 which follows shows the relationship between different
operating ratios and rates of return on investment in the airline in-
dustry. It indicates as well as figures can the importance of stabiliz-
ing .the operating ratio, so far as possible. -
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Reduction in Rate Determination Lag. A second important
advantage of the operating ratio is that it will speed up and simplify
the rate-making process. As time goes on, the application of the
rate-of-return theory to the airlines will become more complicated
and more costly. More and more time will be devoted to valuation
of the assets and determination of the rate base. A sharp reversal
in the economic trend would almost certainly precipitate these prob-
lems into airline rate cases.
The ease of applying the operating ratio as a method of estab-
lishing profits is clear. Through the system of uniform accounts and
annual reports now in effect, such as the Form 41 and other reports
prescribed by the Board, significant averages can be worked out so
that after some experimentation and research the Board can tell
whether a particular airline or group of airlines is healthy or finan-
cially ill.
CONCLUSION
As applied to the older types of regulated industries - railroads,
gas and electric companies, etc. - the rate-of-return-on-investment
method of measuring earnings and fixing rates may be essentially
fair and reasonably adequate. As applied to the airline industry,
however, that method has serious shortcomings. For an industry
with a high capital-turnover rate and volatile revenues and expenses,
the operating ratio is a more significant and a more reliable measure
- and one which has not received the attention due it. If the airline
industry is to withstand the economic shocks which must inevitably
be felt - if it is to acquire on reasonable terms the capital which will
be needed to finance the tremendously costly expansion which is just
ahead, the soundest possible method of regulating its rates and meas-
uring its earnings must be devised. The operating ratio merits
serious examination - at least as a step in that direction.
